Belgium’s Centre for Cybersecurity (CCB) issued an alert on 29 May confirming active exploitation of CVE-2026-41089, a stack-based buffer overflow in the Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC). The vulnerability enables an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller to achieve remote code execution with SYSTEM privileges — no credentials, no user interaction, no prior foothold required.
CVSS 9.8. A public proof-of-concept exploit is available. This is a critical priority for any organisation running Active Directory.
Vulnerability Details
CVE-2026-41089 is a stack-based buffer overflow in the NetrLogonSendToSam function of the Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol service (netlogon.dll). The Netlogon service handles domain authentication for Active Directory — it is present and listening on all Windows domain controllers, both primary and read-only.
The vulnerability exists in input validation for a parameter in the NetrLogonSendToSam RPC call. When a malformed request containing an oversized buffer is sent to the Netlogon service’s named pipe or TCP endpoint, the buffer overflows into adjacent stack memory, overwriting a return address. A carefully crafted overflow payload redirects execution to attacker-controlled code running as SYSTEM.
The attack requires:
- Network access to TCP 445 (SMB, which hosts the Netlogon named pipe) or the Netlogon RPC port on the domain controller
- No authentication credentials
- No user interaction
TCP 445 to domain controllers is typically accessible from all machines in an Active Directory domain — every domain-joined workstation needs to reach its domain controllers on this port for normal domain operations.
Why This Is Particularly Severe
Domain controllers are the most critical servers in most Windows enterprise environments. SYSTEM-level code execution on a domain controller provides:
- Credential extraction: The Domain Secrets (LSA secrets), Kerberos key material, and all domain account hashes (via NTDS.dit) are accessible from SYSTEM on a DC — this is a complete Active Directory domain compromise
- Persistence: An attacker with DC-level SYSTEM access can create domain admin accounts, add backdoor Kerberos tickets (Golden Tickets), and establish persistence that survives subsequent credential resets
- Lateral movement: With domain admin credentials extracted from the DC, an attacker can immediately authenticate as any domain user to any domain-joined system
A successful CVE-2026-41089 exploitation against a domain controller is equivalent to a full Active Directory domain compromise.
Exploitation Status
The CCB alert confirmed active exploitation as of 29 May. The exploitation targeting is currently described as opportunistic — attackers scanning for reachable domain controllers and exploiting unpatched instances — rather than targeting specific high-value organisations. This means the risk is proportional to the time to patch, not to the organisation’s specific threat profile.
The public PoC was released by security researcher “Chaotic Eclipse” on approximately 20–25 May (the same researcher who released MiniPlasma). The availability of a working PoC dramatically reduces the technical barrier for exploitation.
Affected Systems
All Windows Server versions acting as Active Directory Domain Controllers are affected:
- Windows Server 2025 (fully patched prior to the CVE-2026-41089 patch)
- Windows Server 2022
- Windows Server 2019
- Windows Server 2016
- Windows Server 2012 R2 (ESU required)
- Read-Only Domain Controllers (RODCs) are also affected — the vulnerability is in the Netlogon service, which runs on RODCs
Patch
The patch for CVE-2026-41089 is available via Windows Update as a security update (KB numbers will vary by Windows Server version). Apply via:
- Windows Update on the domain controller
- WSUS or SCCM for managed environments
- Microsoft Update Catalog for manual download
For Server 2012 R2 under Extended Security Updates, confirm your ESU coverage and apply the update.
Recommended Actions
Immediate (within 24 hours):
- Apply the CVE-2026-41089 security update to all domain controllers — start with the FSMO role holders, then all remaining DCs
- Prioritise internet-facing DCs and DCs in DMZ or semi-trusted network segments
- After patching, run
netstat -an | findstr ":445"and verify no unexpected established connections exist from external IP addresses
Network-level mitigations (while patching):
- Block TCP 445 from untrusted networks to domain controllers at the perimeter and internal segment boundaries — DC SMB should only be reachable from domain-joined hosts on internal segments, not from DMZ, guest networks, or the internet
- Netlogon RPC ports (typically dynamic in the 49152–65535 range) should similarly be restricted to internal trusted segments
Post-patch investigation:
- Review DC security event logs (Event ID 4625, 4672, 4769) for the period of exposure for signs of exploitation
- Run
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties PasswordLastSet | Sort-Object PasswordLastSetto identify any new accounts created during the exposure window - Check for unexpected members of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins groups
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